Mean household size varied, by camp, though not greatly and with little obvious pattern.

Camp (or cluster)	District/ Agency	Mean household size
Phase I		
Panian 8	Abbotabad	8.6
Bakka Khel	Bannu	11.2
Raghagan	Bajaur	11.0
Shidi	Chitral	9.2
Gamkol 2	Kohat	10.2
Durrani	Kurram	11.0
Barakai 2	Mardan	9.0
Tabbi	N.W'stan	9.1
Hawai 2	Peshawar	9.8
Hawai 8	"	7.8
Phase II		
Michni	Peshawar	9.4
Asgharo	Kurram	11.3
Tank/Dabara	D.I.Khan	10.8

Household heads (the designation was limited to one person per household) were distinguished by age, sex and disability as follows:

Status of household head	No. of households	%age of households
Able-bodied female	2	-
Able-bodied male <18	7	1
Able-bodied male 18-59	530	75
Able bodied male 60-	147	21
Disabled male	18	3

NB (-) indicates cases representing less than 0.5%, 0 indicates no cases

As households often include more than two adult generations, a household headed by an elderly man can include one or more other men of prime working age. The following table gives a better perspective on vulnerability, considered as the absence in a household of any men physically able to support the family. It also presents data on proportions of families with multiple potential breadwinners. To facilitate comparison with other surveys, two different definitions (by age) of able-bodied male are used.

Presence of Able-Bodied Males in Refugee Households

Number of ABMs aged 16-59	%age of households reporting	Number of ABMs aged 18-49	%age of households reporting
0	6	0	16
1	42	1	47
2	27	2	21
3	14	3	9
4	7	4	5
5	3	5	2
6	1	6	-
7	-	7	0
8	-	8	0

Using the more inclusive definition of able-bodied male, a very small proportion of households, 6%, were without one and therefore 'vulnerable'. However, given that casual manual labour is still the most important occupation for Afghan refugees, that the young and the old are generally by-passed at the hiring points, and that many youths between 16 and 18 are still in education, the more restrictive definition might be preferable, raising the proportion of 'vulnerable' households to 16%.

The percentage of families without able-bodied men (using the more restrictive definition) varies between camps:

Percentages of households without able-bodied males, 18-49 years

District/ Agency	PESHAWAR			A'BAD	MARDAN	KOHAT
Camp	Hawai 2	Hawai 8	Michni	Panian	Barakai	Gamkol
%age of hhs with-out ABM	22	22	22	11	8	13
BANNU	D.I.K.	CHITRAL	BAJAUR	KURRAM		N.WAZ
Bakakhel	Tank	Shidi	Ragha.	Durrani	Asgharo	Tabbi
14	22	14	13	14	18	23

The proportion of 'vulnerable' households in this sense varies significantly, but reasons for this are unclear.

181 women in the sample were described as widows. Given the implicit definition of household emerging in the interview process, all but two were listed as members of other households, and their presence is not linked to the rate of 'vulnerability' given above. They may well, however, be vulnerable in other ways: as powerless and marginal to the household to which they have become attached.

98% of sample households contained at least one child of less than 16, with one household reporting 21 children. Mean number of children was therefore 5.3 per household, or 5.4 excluding households with no children.

56 disabled people were reported, only 0.8% of the total sample, but 8% of households included at least one disabled member. Just under half of reported disabilities, 25 out of 56 cases, were due to war, and 18 of those cases were in males over 16. Overall 44 out of 56 disabled people were male, most likely suggesting some underreporting of female disability.

4.2 Education

Educational status of the adult refugees is shown below. It would seem that at least 62% of men, and at least 91% of women, are illiterate.

Educational status	Males by age					Females by age				
	15-19	20-29	30-39	>39	Total	15-19	20-29	30-39	>39	Total
No response	23	40	29	46	138	23	47	16	50	136
Illiterate	168	241	182	453	1044	273	357	264	580	1474
Below primary	49	43	15	11	118	0	2	1	2	5
Completed primary	78	58	12	14	162	0	2	1	0	3
Completed middle	15	15	19	12	61	0	1	1	0	2
Secondary	5	22	15	10	52	0	0	1	0	1
Completed higher	-	4	8	5	17	-	0	0	0	0
Madrasa/ religious	16	11	9	30	66	2	1	0	0	3
Other	1	2	5	8	16	1	1	1	1	4
Total	355	436	294	589	1674	299	411	285	633	1628

Educational attendance of children and young people is only available from the Phase II camps. The following data includes attendance at Government schools, party schools and religious schools.

Educational Attendance Rates by Age, Sex and Camp - Phase II (%)

Age	Michni		Tank		Asgharo		Total	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
5-9	42	22	40	0	31	-	35	3
10-14	88	16	65	1	50	-	59	2
15-19	63	-	18	0	37	0	44	-

Even allowing for the fact that 90% of this ample is from geographically quite remote camps, the figures for female education show dramatically the intense conservatism of the refugee population on this issue.

4.3 Relations with Pakistanis

Refugee families still keep a considerable social distance from their Pakistani neighbours. Only 19% of respondents had Pakistani friends, and only 9% paid such friends visits. On the other hand, only 20 households, 3% of the sample, admitted to having had any dispute with Pakistanis, the largest category having been involved in disputes over firewood collection. None of these figures show significant change since the same questions were asked in the UNRISD survey of 1986.

Relations with Pakistanis do vary between camps. In particular, two of the most remote camps show relatively high rates of Afghan-Pakistani friendship, and Bakakhel and Asgharo show a higher rate of disputes.

Percentage of refugees reporting Pakistani friends and disputes with Pakistanis

District/ Agency	PESHAWAR			A'BAD	MARDAN	KOHAT	BANNU	D.I.K.	CHITRAL	BAJAUR	KURRAM		N.WAZ
Camp	Hawai 2	Hawai 8	Michni	Panian	Barakai	Gamkol	Bakakhel	Tank	Shidi	Ragha.	Durrani	Asgharo	Tabbi
Pakistani friends	18	12	37	9	8	24	12	26	31	37	12	6	13
Disputes	3	2	4	0	0	1	14	1	5	0	2	21	0

5 Registration and Receipt of Rations

5.1 Registration

The number of households claiming to be unregistered was 172, or 24%. Very high rates of registration were found in Raghagan camp, Bajaur Agency (100%) and Hawai 8, the 'new arrivals camp' near Peshawar (98%), and a very low rate in Durrani camp, Kurram Agency (44%). In a separate question, 174 households (25%) possessed no passbook. 15 households, or 2% of the sample, possessed between 2 and 4 passbooks: this probably represents legitimate double registration by large joint families, or families with attached widows. The remaining 73% had one passbook per household.

A total of 3727 individuals were registered, giving a mean number of 7.0 registered individuals per passbook-owning household, and 6.8 registered individuals per passbook. However, the numbers of registered individuals amounted to only 71% of the actual individuals in passbook-owning households. Mean actual size of passbook-owning families was 9.9, and mean actual size of non-passbook owning families was 9.3. In a small proportion of cases, actual household size was less than the number receiving rations; this applied to 44 individuals, equivalent to 1% of the total sample.

5.2 Receipt of Rations

517 households, or 73% of the sample, had been able to collect a wheat ration at the last distribution. In 68% of all cases a household member had collected the ration, in 1% of cases another relative, and in 4% a malik. 50% of families who received rations had done so in the last nine days, but 21% had last received wheat a month ago or more.

Findings on actual receipt of food have been presented in full separately. It generally seemed as if registered households had received the correct 12 kg of wheat per registered individual at the last distribution (the average figure being 10.94 kg per registerd individual), though this did not allow for short measure of which refugees were not aware. Total deductions of which respondents were aware - maliks' charges, millers' charges, transport charges and 'others' amounted to 21% of the wheat ration, 14 % of the edible oil ration and 2% of the kerosene ration.

Actual receipt of rations, though, has to be seen in the context of the average real size of registered households. As this was 9.9, as against a registered size of 7.0 (allowing for the small degree of admitted multiple passbook holding), the actual receipt of rations per person (within registered households) is reduced by a further 28%. The cumulative effect is that net actual receipt is only 6.26 kg at each distribution. When one considers that in 1991 only 8 out of 12 distributions may actually have been made (UNHCR Peshawar Repatriation Report 1991:8), the net monthly receipt among the registered could be only 5 kg per person or less.

6 Expenditure, Living Conditions, and Assets

6.1 Expenditure

It is widely recognized that household expenditure data collected from populations such as Afghan refugees is extremely unreliable. Nevertheless, some of this data is presented in order to provide a ranking of the different types of expenditure incurred.

Approximate median monthly
household expenditure: foodstuffs

Foodstuff	Median monthly expenditure (Rs)
Flour	225
Vegetables	225
Edible oil	125
Meat	100
Rice	75
Sugar	75
Wheat	0
Other food	75

Approximate median monthly household
expenditure: non-food items

Item	Median monthly expenditure (Rs)
Fuel	175
Clothing	125
Medicine	125
Transport	75
Mullah	25
Utensils	25
Rent	0
Electricity	0
Water	0
School	0
Other non-food	75

Median food expenditure overall was in the interval Rs 750-999, median non-food expenditure overall in the interval Rs 500-749, and median total monthly expenditure in the interval Rs 1500-1749, but such figures are presented here for the record only, and we do not believe that they accurately reflect real expenditure. They are substantially higher than corresponding household income figures. Respondents tend to overestimate their expenses and underestimate

their income, but, as we shall see, we have good grounds for believing in this case that our income data is nearer the truth than our expenditure data.

6.2 Living Conditions

Only 17 households, or 2% of the sample, were living in a pukka (brick, concrete, or similar, house). At the other end of the scale, 31 households, 4% of the sample, were living in tents. Condition of housing was not recorded or unclear in a few cases, but at least 93% of households were living in kacha (mud) houses. The highest proportion of pukka houses was found in Hawai 2, with 3% and Michni with 2%. Tank and Hawai 8 showed relatively high proportions of households in tents -16% and 20% respectively.

For the 686 households where it was recorded, number of rooms per household was distributed as follows.

No. of rooms (or tents)	%age of households
1	19
2	39
3	25
4	11
5	3
6	2
7 or more	1

The mean number of rooms (or tents) per household is therefore just over 2.5. The median number of rooms was 2 for the whole sample and for each camp except Bakakhel, Raghagan and Durrani, where it was 3.

In Phase II of the survey, respondents were asked how many other families lived in the same compound with them. Answers varied from no other family to 12 other families. The overall mean, which appears fairly consistent across the three camps, is of 3.1 families (including the respondent's) per compound.

No. of other families in compound	Responding households (%)			
	Michni	Asgharo	Tank/ Dabara	Phase II Total
0	24	29	25	27
1	19	11	4	9
2	20	32	34	31
3	15	12	19	15
4	11	9	6	8
5	7	5	5	5
6	2	1	2	2
7	0	-	2	1
8	0	1	2	1
9-13	2	0	1	1

Sample: 537 households from Phase II

6.3 Assets

Respondents were asked about their possession of a variety of assets, either directly productive or thought to be indices of relative prosperity. The table shows the percentage (of the 704 households in Phase I) reporting each category of asset.

Asset	Households reporting	%age
Sewing machine	136	19
Bicycle	48	7
Carpets	27	4
Weaving Loom	8	1
Kitchen Garden	2	-

In addition, two pick-ups, one motorcycle, three trucks or buses, and two tractors were reported. In other words, at least inasmuch as assets were being reported correctly, refugee families still possess very little in the way of either luxury items or productive assets. This has implications not only for the overall self-sufficiency (or lack of it) of refugees, but also for methods of assessing it: these low levels of asset ownership mean it is

unlikely to be useful as a proxy for overall economic status. Moreover, the commonest of the listed assets, sewing machines, have been distributed in some income-generation projects and are thus even less an index of economic status. 33% of households did have an electricity connection, which as expected varied widely by camp.

Nor did respondents generally admit to significant holdings of livestock.

Species	owner house-holds as %age	Mean holding by owner households
Goats	10	1.8
Sheep	3	23.9[1]
Donkeys	4	1.5
Cattle[2]	20	2.2
Buffalo	3	1.5
Camels	1	2.8
Horses	1	1.7

1) Includes 1 household possessing 400 sheep. Average of other owning households would be 3.1
2) Owing to linguistic problems, these figures may include some non-bovines

The proportion of households in Phase I that kept some livestock was 29%, and in Phase II 57%. Proportions varied markedly between camps, with 72% of households keeping stock in Bakakhel, Bannu District, 70% in Asgharo, Kurram Agency, and high figures in other tribal area camps and Michni, but only 5% of households in Hawai 2 admitting ownership of stock. In most cases probably only a few stock, for milk, are kept: a very small minority appear to be keeping stock for commercial purposes. No household admitted cash income from livestock. 17% of households were also reported as keeping some form of 'poultry business', but in a separate question, no-one admitted any income from such a business.

7 Employment

7.1 Occupation

The questionnaire for Phase I was structured in a complex manner to maximize information on the occupation and earnings of males, whether present or absent. Operationalizing this proved more difficult than expected, and data on these topics could not be reliably collected for all males in the sampled households.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC SURVEYS
OF MALE AFGHAN REFUGEES
IN THE REFUGEE VILLAGES OF NWFP

Final Report

1 Introduction

During 1991 a team of male Afghan interviewers carried out a detailed questionnaire-based survey of 1241 households in Refugee Villages in NWFP. Questionnaire design, training, management of the team and analysis of the data were undertaken by various people, principally from the Peshawar Sub-Office of UNHCR.

The survey was carried out in two phases. In Phase I the team visited 10 Refugee Villages (hereafter 'camps') chosen to represent the main geographical and economic regions of the province. In each camp a 5% sample was taken by visiting every twentieth household.

Name of Camp	District /Agency	Households Surveyed
Panian 3	Abbotabad	56
Bakakhel	Bannu	43*
Raghagan	Bajaur	38
Shidi	Chitral	105
Gamkol 2	Kohat	130
Durrani	Kurram	98
Barakai 2	Mardan	38
Tabbi	N.Waziristan	71
Hawai 2	Peshawar	76
Hawai 8	Peshawar	49
Total		704

A second phase of surveys was undertaken for two reasons. Firstly, it was decided that the team that had been formed and trained could continue to work with the primary purpose of gathering demographic data, i.e. comparing actual and official population figures in different sorts of camp. Secondly, as certain methodological problems had arisen during Phase I (see Appendix), extra socio-economic data was considered useful for comparison. The Phase II survey visited the following camps and clusters.

Processing of questionnaires produces the following occupational profile for men over 16 years of age.

Occupation	Responses	%age
Unskilled labour	1155	74
of which:		
house construction	243	15
brick making	58	4
Shopkeeping and business	113	7
Transport	75	5
Teachers	60	4
Agriculture etc.	57	4
Traditional skills	41	3
Misc. Services	40	3
Profes[l] and clerical	18	1
Mujahideen	6	-
Non-trad skills	5	-
Total	1570	100

The problem with this data is that some men may have been falsely reported as possessing 'no skills'. These may have included some older students, some unemployed, and some men of any occupation for which information was unclear. However, even if all the 697 responses of 'no skills ' are excluded, and it is in the highest degree unlikely that such a drastic modification would be justified, other responses within the unskilled category (house construction, brick making and 'other labour') would still account for 52% of the whole sample. Despite methodological limitations, the conclusion is clear: the camp-resident Afghan population is still overwhelmingly dependent on unskilled manual labour for earning its living.

Of other responses, the 7% recorded above as 'shopkeeping and business' really represent two categories, or at least a broad range. 11 traders, five businessmen, a timber merchant and two mill owner are most likely prosperous, at least by the standards of the refugee community. At the other extreme, 17 vegetable sellers probably earn little more than manual labourers, buying a small stock from wholesalers each day. 45 'shopkeepers' could easily fit with either sub-category. Much the same goes for the 5% involved in transport; 38 men were vehicle owners, 25 were drivers, 5 were animal contractors and 7 were conductors. The skilled workers, both

traditional and non-traditional, probably also fit in between the unskilled and the wealthy; most of them are probably self-employed on a small scale.

'Agriculture' as recorded above is really a misnomer. Over half the responses in this category were actually woodcutters, and only 9, just over 0.5%, farmers in any strict sense. 9 were livestock farmers or shepherds, 7 farm labourers, and 3 beekeepers. It is however likely that some of the unskilled majority work, at least at some times of year, as agricultural labour.


7.2 Employment Status

In only a relative minority of cases in Phase I was a question on employment status answered, by or on behalf of adult males.


Employment status	15-19 years	20-29 years	30-39 years	>40 years	Total	%
Casual	69	136	116	190	511	60
Regular	11	43	49	51	154	18
Self-employed	18	11	54	71	184	21
Trainee	0	1	0	8	9	1
Total	98	221	219	320	858	100

Even on its own, and especially as those not responding (at least those above 20) were likely to be either unemployed or casually employed, the table supports the data on occupation given above. Both the question on employment status and that on current occupation show in broad terms that around two-thirds of Afghan adult males are at the bottom of the economic scale; unskilled and casually employed. This should put into context the widely held perception that 'many' Afghans are now doing quite well economically. The latter are a highly visible minority who may not be, and in some cases may never have been, resident in camps.

Another way of looking at the refugee economy is by a breakdown of the entire male population. This is presented for all camps of Phase II, for which data is more accurate.



71% of men of 'working age' are seen to be working in some way, 77% of able-bodied men of working age and 89% of those who are available for work. The high proportion of the self-employed is caused by the inclusion of Asgharo camp, where the dwarf-palm weaving business is predominant. The same breakdown can be performed for Michni camp, a small sample, but one that could be regarded as quite representative.



Here the working men represent 61% of those of working age, 68% of the able-bodied, and 83% of those available to work. Casual work accounts for 51% of men working.

7.3 Site and Sector

As regards the sites at which men worked, construction sites were the most popular, followed by bazaars, though there was a large residual category of 'others', comprising those who worked at home, in brick-kilns and in offices.

Site/sector	%age of respondents
Construction	36
Bazaar	26
Farm	4
Transport	3
Factory	1
Other	30

Sample = 807 workers

This distribution varies somewhat by camp, though again with little recognizable pattern. In most camps construction was the biggest sector, and this was most noticeable in two of the camps in the FATA. In Kurram Agency, however, the bazaar and home-working (the weaving of dwarf-palm matting in Asgharo camp) were more important. Peshawar and Bannu districts showed most involvement in agriculture, and Hawai 2 and Tank accounted for all the factory workers.

District/ Agency	Camp	Cons	Baz-aar	Farm	Trans port	Fac-tory	Oth er
PESHAWAR	Hawai 2	35	14	0	5	14	28
	Hawai 8	38	8	13	0	0	41
	Michni	12	12	14	2	0	59
ABBOTABAD	Panian 3	51	24	3	2	0	20
MARDAN	Barakai 2	36	19	2	2	0	40
KOHAT	Gamkol 2	32	28	4	7	0	29
BANNU	Bakakhel	31	35	9	4	0	21
D.I.KHAN	Tank/Dabara	27	31	5	6	3	29
CHITRAL	Shidi	29	23	4	0	0	43
BAJAUR	Raghagan	58	29	0	4	0	9
KURRAM	Durrani	20	33	3	5	0	38
	Asgharo	15	10	4	3	0	68
N.WAZ'STAN	Tabbi	55	25	1	0	0	18

Sample = 807 workers

7.4 Labour Migration

Survey methods were not well-adapted to uncover the extent of labour migration away from camps, even by members of households who remained. During Phase I, 36 males over 16 were reported as being, or within the year having been in, Rawalpindi, 16 in the rest of the Punjab, 5 in Karachi, 3 in Quetta, 5 abroad and 21 in Afghanistan. There is also substantial migration of both casual labourers and the self-employed from outlying parts of NWFP towards Peshawar.

8 Income

8.1 Wage Rates and Individual Incomes

Given that casual labour, largely unskilled and largely in the construction industry, is the most important occupation for refugees, a key question regarding casual labour is how many days a man is hired in a month.

Casual labourers: days hired per month by age group

Days hired	15-19 years	20-29 years	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years	>60 years	Total	Total 20-49
<10	2	1	7	5	9	5	29	13
10-14	1	5	23	23	17	10	79	51
15-19	3	10	18	24	25	4	84	52
20-24	2	8	21	25	15	4	75	54
> 24	1	4	6	5	4	2	22	15

Sample: 289 Casual Labourers from Phase I

The median is the same, 15 days work per month, for every age group except the oldest, where it is 11, and the 20-29 year olds where it is 18. The total median and the median for the core age groups are also 15. This is slightly lower than figures from hiring point surveys in Peshawar, and certain other current estimates, but higher than figures from surveys in smaller towns. It is important to notice also the spread of this variable; 35% of the core age groups worked less than 15 days (but 37% worked 20 days or more).

Sub-samples are probably too small to determine if the number of days worked per month varies by camp. The median in each camp (except Bakakhel, Bannu, where it was slightly lower) was in the 15-19 bracket, with the highest median found in Shidi, Chitral. Hiring point surveys have pointed to relatively high rates of days worked in Peshawar and Mardan, and low rates in Haripur and especially Kohat.

For casual labourers, daily wages were mostly around Rs 35-40. The median wage rate was Rs 35 for the whole sample and for the core age groups. Only the 40-49 age group seemed to demand significantly higher wages; more men in these age groups may possess specialist manual skills. The mean for the whole sample was Rs 37.

Wage (Rs)	15-19 years	20-29 years	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years	> 60 years	Total	Total 20-49
16-20	0	2	0	2	4	5	13	4
21-25	1	0	3	7	5	4	20	10
26-30	5	8	19	15	22	4	73	42
31-35	1	5	19	14	15	4	58	38
36-40	1	7	21	25	13	6	73	53
41-45	0	0	2	3	2	2	9	5
46-50	1	5	7	12	4	1	30	24
51-55	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
> 55	0	2	5	3	4	0	14	10

Sample: 291 casual labourers from Phase I

This is slightly lower than hiring point surveys would have led us to believe (in the summer of 1991 daily wages were Rs 40-45 in Peshawar, and in January 1992 they were up to Rs 50 in Mansehra and Haripur). However, it should be noted that the household survey pre-dates the hiring point surveys in the small towns by around 6 months, and that even in January 1992 daily wages were Rs 35-40 in Mardan and Kohat. It should also be noted that the hiring point surveys reflect an urban wage rate, while rural wage rates, set by agricultural wages, can run lower. Between June 1990 and June 1991 the average agricultural wage in NWFP, as evidenced by the admittedly small samples taken by the Federal Bureau of Statistics, had fluctuated between Rs 31 and 41, and probably remained just below Rs 40 over the summer.

Obviously these wage rates must be considered in conjunction with previous findings on the number of days worked per month. These figures would suggest a central tendency of casual labourers' incomes in the bracket Rs 525-800 per month. This would actually appear higher than the average found in hiring point surveys, where days worked were lower, even if wages were in places higher.

Among those reporting a monthly income (who were in fact a mixture of casual labourers not personally available for income and the regularly- or self-employed) the older age groups were again earning larger sums. Even for these groups reported monthly

earnings were generally very low.

Data on monthly earnings and daily wages (multiplied by days worked), can be combined as follows.

Monthly income by employment status

Employment status	Rs 1-500	Rs 501 - 1000	Rs 1001 - 1500	Rs 1501 - 2000	Rs 2001 - 2500	> Rs 2500
Unclear	-	-	-	-	1	1
Casual	148	258	75	22	10	5
Regular	17	59	59	10	3	4
Self-employed	7	51	53	42	9	22
Trainee etc.	0	1	1	0	0	0
Total	172	369	188	74	23	32

Sample: 858 workers from Phase I

Median income for casual workers is well below Rs 1000/month, and for regular workers around Rs 1000/month. Even among the self-employed, median income was under 1500 and only 12% admitted to earning more than Rs 2500/month, itself hardly an index of wealth. For all male earners, the median monthly income is Rs 800, while the mean is Rs 974.

14 households, 2% of the sample, reported earnings by women or children, of between Rs 60 and Rs 1500 per month. The median household income (from all such sources put together) was Rs 500. Tailoring was the most popular such occupation, followed by embroidery. Under survey conditions, however, some underreporting of female (and child) contributions to household income is likely.

8.2 Household Income

In interpreting data on household income, the very large reported household sizes must be taken into account. This is supported by the distribution of households by the number of males reporting any work.

No. of earners	%age of h.holds (Ph.I)	%age of h.holds (Ph.II)
0	11	3
1	63	57
2	21	23
3	5	11
4	1	4
5-8	0	2

The mean number of earners per household in Phase I was 1.22, but in Phase II it grew to 1.65. This might be attributable to the economically active and their earnings being more exhaustively traced, but it affects principally proportions of households with three or more earners, who are increased, and households without earners, who are decreased. 80% of households in either case have one or two earners.

Mean number of earners (= males over 16 reporting any work) per household, and persons per earner

District/ Agency	PESHAWAR			A'BAD	MARDAN	KOHAT
Camp	Hawai 2	Hawai 8	Michni	Panian	Barakai	Gamkol
Earners/ h.hold	0.97	0.92	1.24	1.13	1.25	1.33
Persons/ earner	10.1	8.5	7.6	7.6	7.2	7.7
BANNU	D.I.K.	CHITRAL	BAJAUR	KURRAM		N.WAZ
Bakakhel	Tank	Shidi	Ragha.	Durrani	Asgharo	Tabbi
1.63	1.69	1.15	1.20	1.40	1.68	1.20
6.9	6.4	8.0	9.2	7.9	6.7	7.6

As can be seen, the difference between Phase I and Phase II camps is largely accounted for by some sort of geographical variation, plus the very high rate of employment (in palm-matting) in Asgharo. The fact that Michni, the camp in Phase II most typical of the core areas of refugee settlement, shows a figure close to the Phase I average, adds credibility to the Phase I figures, including the crucial figures on household income and per capita income.

Total household monthly income has been derived from statements on male and female earnings educed by various sections of the questionnaire. Although Phase II results might be thought to be more reliable, given better training of the interviewers, the chief differences are a smaller proportion of households with very low admitted income, but a greater proportion of households in the 'middle income' bracket of Rs 600-1400 per month. 'Middle income' here is of course strictly relative; these groups could still be considered on or below the poverty line.

Income (Rs)	%age of h.holds (Ph.I)	%age of h.holds (Ph.II)
0- 199	11	2
200- 399	7	3
400- 599	9	5
600- 799	11	19
800- 999	12	11
1000-1199	8	13
1200-1399	11	11
1400-1599	8	8
1600-1799	5	6
1800-1999	4	7
2000-2199	4	3
2200-2399	2	2
2400-2599	2	3
2600-2799	1	2
> 2800	7	6

Although the median monthly household income in Phase I is Rs 1000 per month, the mean value is higher, Rs 1262 per month. Such a value would give a mean monthly per capita income of Rs 129. The Phase II median and mean values are somewhat higher, at Rs 1100 and Rs 1309 respectively, but as average household size is greater, mean per capita income is lower at Rs 120.

Name of Camp(s)	District/ Agency	Households Surveyed
Michni	Peshawar	54
Asgharo 1-4	Kurram	263
Tank 1-3, Dabara	D.I.Khan	220
Total		537

For certain key aspects of the study, Phase II data may be more reliable, but the camps surveyed in Phase II, being selected primarily for demographic interest, are not representative of NWFP in the same way as camps in Phase I. As a result, this interim report will principally present data from Phase I, introducing Phase II data when the context demands. Aggregate tables and data in the text are presented for 704 households of Phase I, unless otherwise indicated. Campwise variation is generally illustrated by all 13 camps and clusters.

This report is being released in its final form after the events of April 1992 in Kabul that are likely to lead to mass repatriation, although the data was collected the previous year, and was given limited circulation in February 1992. We nevertheless hope that it will be useful as a record of the refugee population in NWFP in 1991, and in the planning of repatriation.

Mean household income shows significant variation across camps, though some of this is explained by geographical variation in reported household size. Per capita income is also presented campwise in the same table.

District/ Agency	PESHAWAR			A'BAD	MARDAN	KOHAT
Camp	Hawai 2	Hawai 8	Michni	Panian	Barakai	Gamkol
Mean hh. income	1342	998	1188	1089	1123	1250
Mean p.c. income	137	128	127	126	124	122
BANNU	D.I.K.	CHITRAL	BAJAUR	KURRAM		N.WAZ
Bakakhel	Tank	Shidi	Ragha.	Durrani	Asgharo	Tabbi
1304	1254	1490	927	1525	1375	1038
116	116	161	84	138	122	114

In a few cases, households reported incomes other than from employment or self-employment. These have not been processed in such a way as to be easily combined with the above figures, but are sufficiently few, and almost certainly relating to the wealthiest households, that they should not affect the overall conclusions drawn. Three households reported income from property in Afghanistan, one income from poultry, two from farming in Pakistan. Two households reported receiving remittances from Pakistan, seven from Afghanistan, and two incomes from other sources.

8.3 Per Capita Income

Given the very large household sizes, per capita income is a more useful indicator of overall prosperity than total household income. Per capita income has been derived from total male and female earnings, i.e ignoring the other income sources mentioned in the last paragraph, but the few households reporting such incomes are likely to lie in the upper ranges of the distribution. It should also be made clear that the value of food aid received has not been included in income. Nor has the value of any food produced by households, but the low level of livestock ownership, plus the very low level of vegetable cultivation, makes this negligible.

Per capita income distribution is portrayed graphically in three ways. Figure A gives the distribution of Phase I households by per capita income. The distribution of individuals by per capita income, which could equally have been chosen, is not in this case

significantly different; a smaller proportion is in the very lowest band and a fractionally larger proportion in the middle bands.

Figure B presents the same data as a cumulative frequency graph, enabling the percentage of households below any given income cut-off to be identified. One such cut-off would be the figure of Rs 158 per person per month for 1990-91 (the survey in fact took place in Pakistan FY 1991-92), proposed in a review of literature on Pakistani poverty lines. The figure was argued as follows; a) the poverty line for Pakistanis in NWFP in 1985-86 had been placed at Rs 145 per person per month by a reputable Pakistani economist in a World Bank study, b) inflation ran at just over 50% between 1986 and 1991, leading to a figure of Rs 220, c) the figure could be reduced by 10% as Afghan households are believed to have a higher proportion of young children, d) the figure was reduced by a further 20% to allow for lower non-food expenditure among Afghans compared to Pakistanis. This last operation, among other things, removes the necessity of imputing a rent to Afghans currently occupying free housing. The overall figure represents a putative poverty line for Afghans if food aid were discontinued, but would be a low estimate if refugees became liable to pay for all essential services at market prices. In any event, it can be seen from Figure B that this particular line is higher than the per capita incomes of around 70% of refugee households.

Figure C portrays the interquartile ranges and means of per capita expenditure for each camp, and the Phase I and II totals. The interquartile ranges exclude the top and bottom 25% of households in each case, so the incomes of the most representative group in each camp can be seen in comparison with each other. They can also be seen in comparison with the poverty line for refugees explained above, and its Pakistani equivalent of Rs 220 per person per month. Campwise variations, though considerable, are less significant when seen against these poverty lines. As with most campwise variations, it is difficult to see a clear pattern. Two of the four camps in the Tribal areas show low incomes, but the other two are in the same range as, or higher than, camps in the settled areas.

A full discussion of trends in income since the UNRISD survey of 1986 would require a careful consideration of methodology as well as household composition. Per capita income levels, though, can be compared: UNRISD reported a median per capita income of Rs 46 per month. Allowing for inflation at just over 50%, this would translate into Rs 70 at 1991 prices. As the median per capita income in both Phase I and Phase II was Rs 110, there has almost certainly been a net improvement in refugees' self-sufficiency, even if incomes still compare unfavourably with poverty lines.

Given the importance of per capita income statistics, it is worth summarizing discussions above on their reliability. In terms of individual incomes, monthly income levels for casual labour, which makes up the majority of Afghan employment, are in accord with

estimates from other sources. Those in regular employment may have underreported their monthly income; more sophisticated tabulation might cast light on this. There may have been categories of income unreported or severely underreported; this would apply especially to some forms of illegal activity. It is however, unlikely that such activity directly effects large numbers of refugees, and thus that it would effect the inter-quartile ranges shown. The final possible criticism is that individual earners were omitted from household income statistics. This is particularly relevant with regard to Phase I of the survey, and the difference in earners per household between Phases I and II lends support to it. However, Michni, the most representative of the Phase II camps has earners per household, person per earner and per capita income figures very similar to most Phase I camps, and the difference in earners per household figures seems to relate more to households with most earners or no earners, not the middle 80% with one or two. It may well be that mean per capita income figures are too low by one quarter, but even so substantial proportions of refugees would fall below anything that could be called a poverty line.



Per Capita Income
of Afghan Refugees in NWFP
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
%
40
80
120
160
200
240
280
320
360
400
Rs./Month

FIG. A



Per Capita Income
By Cumulative %
Cumulative %
100
80
60
40
20
0
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
340
Rs./Month

FIG. B

FIGURE C: INTER QUAR[illegible] RANGES & MEANS OF MONTHLY PER CAPITA INCOME ([illegible])

Raghagan(BJ) 35 84 * 100

Durrani(KRM) 66 138 * 160

Asgharo(KRM) 71 122 * 150

Tabbi(NW) 60 114 * 125

Shidi(CT) 72 161 * 200

Panian3(ABD) 68 126 * 171

Barakai(MRD) 51 124 * 142

Gamkol2(KT) 66 122 * 150

Bakakhel(BNU) 62 116 * 14[illegible]

Tank/Dabara(DIK) 80 116 * 146

Michni(PSH) 63 127 * 157

Hawai2(PSH) 0 137 * 205

Hawai8(PSH) 42 129 * 153

Phase I Total 60 129 * 163

Phase II Total 75 120 * 150

Rs 158

Rs 220

APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY

The survey used male Afghan enumerators administering a questionnaire that had been developed jointly by several people in UNHCR's Peshawar Sub-Office. The questionnaire was pre-tested by the team leader and again by the enumerators during training. 10 camps were chosen by the staff of Sub-Office Peshawar to represent the major geographical and economic divisions of NWFP. In each camp, the Refugee Village Administrator and refugee elders were first of all briefed on the reasons behind, and the methodology of, the survey. The camp was then mapped, so that teams of two interviewers could be assigned to one discrete sector at a time. Households were counted, with the assistance of refugee elders, and every twentieth household identified, in order to obtain a random 5% sample. Heads or representatives of those households were generally given an appointment to be interviewed in a mosque or other public place.

The general methodological problems of studying Afghan refugee economy and society have been discussed elsewhere[1]. During Phase I of the household survey the following problems were encountered:

General difficulties in surveying a population inclined to be secretive on many topics, a trait exacerbated by a climate of rumour relating socio-economic surveys to possible reductions in assistance

Problems in defining the boundaries of camps

Unexpected difficulties in the training and field management of Afghan staff, in areas such as random sampling and understanding of branching or conditional questionnaires.

These general problems were manifested as:

Weakness in data collected on occupation and income, particularly with regard to household members working away from home, owing to a lack of understanding of the questionnaire and the intentions behind it.

Interviewers substituted a neighbouring household for a household in which no male was available for interview. This will have produced some bias in information on employment and on female-headed households. In addition, the inability or unwillingness of the team to negotiate entry into domestic compounds, and the consequent holding of interviews in mosques, may have reduced the reliability of responses.

In some camps, interviewers also substituted a neighbouring household for any household registered in another camp. This probably led to an underestimation of camp size when the data was used for demographic purposes, but probably did not bias

socioeconomic data significantly. This problem was most marked in Barakai and Gamkol. In other cases, most notably Shidi and Tabbi, the 'camps' can scarcely be said to have boundaries at all. In these cases, team members were led by elders to refugees registerd at the camps scattered variously in open country, other camps, and Pakistani settlements. In one camp, Bakkakhel, operational difficulties meant that a full 5% sample was not obtained, and a camp population size cannot, therefore, be extrapolated from our sample.

After the completion of Phase I, it was decided to continue surveying, primarily for the purpose of estimating populations, but also to gather further socio-economic data. During Phase II, the questionnaire was stream-lined, particularly in the problematic sections on work away from home, further training was given to the team and closer supervision exercised in the field. The procedure of taking every twentieth household was observed more rigorously, and interviewers were able to enter domestic compounds. Most of the difficulties laid out above (though not the cluster of problems relating to Afghan refugee secretiveness) were therefore solved in Phase II. However, as stated, the camps selected in Phase II were less representative of NWFP as a whole, as large samples were taken in DI Khan and Kurram Agency (the latter additionally being unrepresentative by its reliance on dwarf plam weaving) and only a small sample from the core areas around Peshawar. This explains the procedure adopted of using Phase I data for provincial aggregate figures in most cases, while using Phase II data as a check.

In general, as has been shown throughout the report, Phase II results did not show significant variations from Phase I, except in ways that can largely be explained by geographical variation. We are therefore convinced that the methodological difficulties encountered during Phase I do not weaken the important conclusions reached in this report.

1) Annex on Methodology in J.Morton, The Socio-Economic Status of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, UNHCR, Islamabad, 1992

ANNEX 1

CONTACTS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Conversations with the following individuals were particularly helpful in compiling certain subsections.

Name	Section
Engineer Malang, UNHCR Peshawar	Section 2.3
Ivor Telfer, Salvation Army	Section 2.4
Naeem Durrani, UNHCR Islamabad	Section 2.5
Paul Fishstein, SCF-USA Quetta	Section 2.6
Engineer Wahed " "	"
Nancy Leach, SWABAC Quetta	"
Qadir Popol, SCF-USA Islamabad	Section 2.7

The use made of their information is entirely my own responsibility. Among others who provided very valuable information were:

Sultan Aziz, SCF-USA Islamabad
Nancy Dupree, ARIC Peshawar
Randy Martin, IRC Peshawar
Dr Abdul Moqim Rahmanzai, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Peshawar
Weng Zhigang, WFP Quetta
Jan Karpowicz, Andrew Jilani, EIL Islamabad
Kaiser Bengali, SEBCON Islamabad
Richard English, DAI
and UNHCR staff too numerous to mention.

I would like to thank all those who were involved in the planning and implementation of the UNHCR 1991 household surveys in NWFP and Punjab, and in particular Margaret Sinclair, who was not only the co-ordinator of those surveys, but also provided invaluable help in many other aspects of compiling this report, organizing other pieces of research, and understanding the refugee community in general.

I would also like to thank UNHCR support staff in Islamabad, Peshawar and Quetta for their help during my consultancies.

ANNEX 2

SECTORS OF AFGHAN EMPLOYMENT IN PAKISTAN: SOME NOTES

This annex presents information obtained from various sources on some sectors of the Pakistani economy in which Afghans are, or might be supposed to be, found. Observations will in places be unsystematic, but will at least provide a ready reference for any future research in these sectors.

Transport

Afghans are highly visible in the transport sector in Pakistan, in freight haulage and in public transport. Zeb (1992) has attempted the difficult task of reviewing official data on vehicle numbers, and also provides data on degree of Afghan penetration of different sub-sectors, and incomes of owners, drivers and conductors. Some details relating to NWFP are given in Section 3.2 of the text. The 1986 UNRISD survey put 10.5% of the male workforce in this sector (the figure is derived from separate statistics for casual and permanent employees and the self-employed in the sector). The survey in the NWFP camps in 1991 (UNHCR and Morton 1992) found a rather lower figure of 5% of adult males working in transport. Numbers of vehicles estimated in Zeb's study would give a similar order of magnitude for Afghans employed in this sector.

English (1989) discusses transport in the Tribal Areas. A small survey found that three-quarters of drivers were Afghan, but with the exception of tractors, Afghans and Pakistanis were found in all types of vehicle. English's secondary data on Afghan-owned vehicles, however, are at variance with Zeb's and other recent findings. The finding by RAASTA (1992:8) that the mujahideen group Jamiat-e-Islami owns a fleet of 70 buses in Karachi is also interesting.

Agriculture

Given the tenurial pattern in NWFP, it is surprising how little involvement in agriculture is reported in camp-based surveys. The UNRISD survey found about 3% of the male workforce engaged in agriculture in various roles, and the recent household surveys a negligible 0.5%. The camp monitoring exercise of 1992, found very little evidence of land purchase by refugees, and sharecropping was only significant in Mansehra District and a few other pockets (Morton 1992b).

2 Background

2.1 Geographical and Ethnic Origin

Refugees had come from 17 of Afghanistan's 29 provinces.

Province	No. of Households	%
Nangarhar	209	30
Paktia	135	19
Kabul	69	10
Kunar	54	8
Kapisa	42	6
Baghlan	36	5
Parwan	34	5
Laghman	33	5
Kunduz	33	5
Logar	19	3
Badakhshan	15	2
6 other provinces	25	4

This distribution is broadly in accordance with existing data on refugee origins in NWFP, such as the 1987-88 Origins Survey. Of the provinces that did not feature prominently in the latter, Kapisa and Badakhshan are almost entirely accounted for by respondents in Shidi camp, Chitral District, and Parwan by Barakai 2 and Hawai 2. The similarity of the origins profile to the Origins Survey and other sources, serves as a quasi-independent confirmation of the representativeness of the Phase I camps vis-a-vis the refugee population of NWFP.

Dealing first with sharecropping and tenancy, the Agricultural Census of 1980 reported the following figures:

Tenant-operated farms[1], NWFP and Mianwali

Province/District	No. of farms	%	Total acreage	%
NWFP	95315	18	607549	15
of which: Peshawar	24824	29	115588	31
Mardan	26843	32	109960	28
Mianwali District	26856	24	435156	18

1) Does not include farms operated partly by their owners

Given the very large number of farms (and large acreage) that were under tenancy in the areas that have since become refugee affected, and given that the Pakistani government does not prohibit renting or sharecropping of farms, it is surprising how little these opportunities seem to have been taken up by refugees. As forms of tenancy have been reported anecdotally in various areas, and confirmed by camp monitoring in Mansehra, Dir, N.Waziristan and Kohat, one explanation may be that sharecropping refugees have moved their residences out of the camps and are thus not showing up in camp-based surveys. Mansehra is particularly interesting, as it is reported by local people there that farms previously sharecropped by Pakistanis are now being rented for cash by Afghans. As cash tenancy gives greater marginal returns for work, but is also more risky, it may be more attractive to Afghans who have some safety net in the form of a ration.

Wage labour on farms may be a different matter. Although only 14,086 farms in NWFP reported using permanent hired labour in 1980 (a total of 23,617 labourers - corresponding figures in Mianwali were 3871 farms employing 7324 labourers), employment of casual farm labourers was obviously enormous.

Province/District	Farms reporting casual labour	as % of all private farms
NWFP	192727	37
of which: Peshawar	55142	65
Mardan	56708	67
Kohat	25079	48
Abbotabad	26332	21
Mianwali District	77333	69

The actual number of such labourers is unreported. It is highly likely that a substantial proportion of Afghan refugees in NWFP and Mianwali appearing in surveys as 'casual labour', 'unskilled' and the like are, at least at certain times of year, participating in

agriculture as wage labour. As Mianwali affords the greatest opportunities, it is likely that agricultural labour is one source of the relative prosperity of Kot Chandna camp.

Finally, the involvement of some refugees in horticulture within the camps should be noted. This is said to be a speciality of people from around Jalalabad, practised in the Kababian and Hawai camps (see Christensen 1990:33). Kitchen gardens, however, were reported minimally in the recent camp-based surveys.

The situation in Balochistan is very different. In 1980 there were only 2019 tenant-operated farms in the four districts to become refugee-affected. Permanent agricultural labour was minimal; information on casual labour was not collected, but there are unlikely to have been many opportunities. There are however reports of refugees being given land outright by Pakistani kinsmen, notably around Loralai, there may be Afghan involvement in horticulture for the Quetta market, and one can speculate that Afghans have become involved in agriculture in the more fertile lowlands of Balochistan, the Kachi and Nasirabad areas

There is also a considerable movement of Afghan men from the camps of NWFP who move into the Punjab each year, principally for the May wheat harvest. One variation on this, observed in Mansehra, is for one or more Afghans to buy a tractor, ride it to the Punjab, and hire both it and themselves for the season (M.Werntz, pers comm).

Wage rates for casual agricultural labour are accessible, from the Monthly Statistical Bulletins of the Federal Bureau of Statistics which collects a monthly average in each province. Fluctuations are considerable.

Monthly average wage rates for casual farm labour (Rs)

	NWFP	Punjab	B'stan
Range (June 1990-May 1991)	36.36 -41.33	31.92 -47.80	29.36 -52.31
June 1991	38.20	42.50	47.40

The agricultural sector presents a major challenge for an investigation of refugee economic participation. However, short of an Agricultural mini-Census (and even a mini-Census would be a major enterprise) we are unlikely to receive much systematic information on the topic.

Brickmaking

Brickmaking in Pakistan has traditionally been performed by whole families of low-caste bonded labourers, trapped by debt. Legislation to make this system illegal has coincided with the ready availability of Afghan refugee labour in some parts of the country. As the legislation is far from being strictly enforced, it would seem that the sheer hard work put in by the Afghans is the important factor in their increasing predominance in the sector.

In NWFP, a dedicated researcher into the subject (Dr Tufail Khan, pers comm) has estimated that 70% of brick kiln labour in the province is now Afghan, although it must be admitted that in late 1990 he was citing a much lower figure of 20%. On the higher estimate, and using certain other estimates (notably that there are 1000 kilns in NWFP) it would seem possible that there are 14,000 Afghan families who have taken up residence in accomodation provided by kiln-owners, and an additional 14,000 Afghan men commuting to the kilns from refugee camps. While this estimate is largely derived from knowledge of kilns around Peshawar, it is true that kilns around Haripur are also dominated by Afghan labour. In 1986 1.4% of the male workforce were making bricks and this increased to 3% in Phase I of the recent surveys (UNHCR and Morton 1992) which is of the same order of magnitude to, if lower than, the above estimate.

Afghan men, boys and young girls take part in the work, which is paid at a rate of Rs 50/1000 bricks, about what an adult can make unassisted in a day. Given that kilns are usually closed in the months of November and December, and that at other times of year heavy rain can stop all work for up to a week, Dr Khan estimates Rs 1000-1200 as a good monthly wage for an adult, Rs 800 as an average wage. These would be increased somewhat if the whole family are working. However, as Afghans are now becoming involved in the loan system, the accounting for which is at best a mystery to them and often blatantly fraudulent, they may not be paid in full for their work. Net income might be estimated at Rs 1000 per family per month (see also Khan and Shah 1991).

Afghans, principally Dr Khan feels the unregistered, are attracted to kiln work by free housing, electricity and the availability of loans. Kiln-owners favour Afghans as hard working and less likely to unionize. The entrappment of Afghans in the loan system of the NWFP kilns, may be counted, or may turn into, a social issue. The implications of the loan system for repatriation are also hard to disentangle.

It is reported (Manzooruddin 1990) that all the functioning kilns around Quetta and in the Nasirabad area employ only Afghans, and Afghans are also employed in Sibi. However, given 20-25 men or boys per kiln (Manzooruddin pers comm) the kilns counted in the report would only account for around 800 Afghan jobs. Work is also highly

seasonal. Wage rates are slightly higher than in NWFP, at Rs 60/1000 bricks, but there is a suggestion that this rate has been substantially lowered for Afghans.

Brickmaking is also one economic activity taken up by refugees who migrate temporarily or permanently to the Punjab. Qadir and Nasir (1991a) report over 1100 Afghan families involved in the Rawalpindi area, and others in at least 6 other areas of Punjab (1991b). Brickmaking is also one activity of refugees in Kot Chandna camp, though it appears from the household survey to involve only 10% of the male workforce. Rates are Rs 70-80/1000 bricks. Although groups of unaccompanied men will often migrate temporarily for this sort of work, there seems again to be a trend towards employment of men with their children.

Livestock

Attempting to quantify livestock holdings in any traditional society is likely to be difficult, and still more so with refugees. Some existing surveys have been mentioned in the main text (Sardie 1984, Forsbach et al. 1986, Afghan Refugees Operation 1985). The 1991 household surveys and the 1992 camp monitoring suggest that only around 30% of families own any livestock (excluding poultry), and that these predominantly own only two or three milch animals. From these figures a guesstimate of 315,000 head for livestock owned by camp-resident refugees in NWFP can be derived. The highest previous estimate, namely the NWFP Livestock Survey of 1985, seems in contrast to indicate just less than one animal per refugee. As discussed in the text (p.12), this could be brought as evidence for a broader thesis that refugees were living partially off capital in this period, but this might be stretching uncertain data too far.

Neither set of data includes the unknown number of refugees who keep significant herds away from the camps, possibly even inside Afghanistan. We can guess that such households are rare, and many of them may not be, or have ever been, camp-resident, but there is no way of quantifying them. In this connection a survey was performed in 1981 to try and count Afghan and Pakistani nomads entering and leaving the main valleys of NWFP, which produced extremely unsatisfactory results (UNHCR 1982). At an absolute maximum, it found only 2,000 nomadic Afghan households.

The male household survey enquired whether households kept a 'poultry business' which was reported in only 17% of cases. however the camp monitoring exercise of 1992 found that over 50% of refugee households were keeping poultry, in 16 out of 21 camps.

Factories and Manufacturing Industry

The involvement of Afghans in manufacturing industry in the Jamrud Road Industrial Estate, Peshawar (see Morton 1991) was of interest in that a) the trend was presumed to be new and growing, and b) workers were accepting extremely low daily wages for de facto security of employment. Overall numbers, however, were insignificant, even in comparison with the population of the nearest camps. Since then we have failed to turn up any significant evidence of Afghan employment in factories elsewhere. Afghans are heavily involved in building factories in the Haripur area: the author was told that they do not work in them once built, but this may not be completely true. The Mardan Sugar Mill, one of the largest single industrial units in NWFP, is now known to employ no Afghans. Given that there were in 1988-89 only 348 registered factories in NWFP (of which 62 were small textile works in the Swat Valley, away from refugee concentrations, and many more have been covered by the Jamrud Road survey and informal enquiries in Haripur), given that their total workforce is probably only around 40,000 (Census of Manufacturing Industry 1986-87) and given the extremely low rates of factory employment reported in the household surveys, it seems highly unlikely that the formal factory sector in NWFP at present employs significant numbers of Afghans. One indication of this is that the Tarbela Textile Mill which stands literally next door to Panian camp, employs only 7 or 8 Afghans in a total workforce of 1000. It is however possible a) that such employment might grow in future, and b) that there is substantial employment in small unregistered workshops. The latter, however, really forms part of the bazaar, or of the informal sector, and meaningful investigation of it would in practice prove very difficult.

The same remarks apply, if anything more forcefully, to Balochistan. In areas of the province that could be considered refugee-affected (i.e excluding Las Bela) there are 39 registered 'factories'. Of these, the cloth factories are in fact closed, one other large unit employs only skilled workers, and many of the others are in fact railway yards and power stations, which as strategic industries are legally barred to Afghans (Major Niaz pers comm).

The related mining and quarrying sector may be of more importance to Afghans. The coal mines near Quetta employ Afghans, but the majority of these are believed to be economic migrants from Hazarajat who have never been registered or resident in camps. Quarries may be significant employers of casual labour in some rural areas of both provinces.

Begging and Scavenging

Reports that Afghan women and children are engaging in begging and scavenging have emerged from Peshawar and Karachi. It is virtually impossible to quantify the problem, but a study by UNHCR staff (Shereen and Irene 1991) shows that many female beggars in Peshawar are of the Joggi tribe, who have traditionally been professional beggars in Afghanistan. Others however, are from mainstream ethnic groups and are usually unregistered widows, forced into this way of life in spite of severe social pressures against it, and often therefore working far from their home camp. Their existence, unquantified as it is, points to the fragility of inter-household support mechanisms among the refugees. As might be expected, begging and scavenging were reported in insignificant numbers, in the household surveys in the camps. The female survey, probably the most reliable, found 15 males begging, and 6 males and one female scavenging, in its sample of 944 households.

ANNEX 3

PAKISTANI POVERTY LINES AND AFGHAN REFUGEES

Literature on employment and income levels among Afghan refugees has tended to ignore, or deal in a cursory way with, the question of what constitutes self-sufficiency, and how this can be quantified. A review of a few key interventions in the now considerable literature on poverty lines in Pakistan may help to put this discussion on a more systematic footing. Such a review may have been attempted by Christensen and Scott (1988:48-49) but they still present the impression that their choice of Rs 75/person/month was arbitrary. As we shall see, it is also very low.

Most recent contributions to the debate on poverty lines use as their starting point the Pakistan Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) of 1984-85. This was the latest available at the time of writing these contributions. The survey used a national sample of 16,500 households, but excluded the FATA, Kohistan, Chitral and Malakand and is believed to have underenumerated poor rural households in Balochistan and Sindh (World Bank 1990:10), which have probably driven poverty lines derived from this data set up. Work based on the HIES data-set has used expenditure rather than income levels on which to base poverty lines, in accordance with worldwide literature, and specifically because expenditure data from surveys is felt to be more reliable than income data, and because it is frequently more regular than income. This does not prevent, in principle, comparison of poverty lines with the present or future income of Afghan refugees, which is the procedure followed in the main body of the report. A further point to be born in mind is that HIES has included 'imputed expenditure' such as consumption of home-grown produce.

Quantified poverty lines will be quoted here in their 1984-85 forms and in a 1990-91 projection. The Sensitive Price Index (SPI), which covers items of daily use to low income groups, has risen by 52% between FY84-85 and FY 1990-91, while the more general Combined Consumer Price Index (CCPI) has risen by 50%. The higher figure is taken here.

Pakistani Poverty Lines

One very simple approach to drawing a poverty line, mentioned by the World Bank (1990:4), is to define the lowest 40% of the population (in terms of per capita monthly expenditure adjusted for adult equivalence) as 'poor' and the bottom 20% as 'very poor'. Poverty lines defined by this method are as follows.

(Rs per capita per month)

	1984-5	1990-1
'Very Poor'	Rs 151	Rs 230
'Poor'	Rs 194	Rs 295

Note: Original cites figures for adult equivalents; these figures are re-adjusted

Poverty lines defined in this way for the Pakistani population are useful for comparative purposes, but have very limited use for the Afghan refugee population.

Other approaches combine the following elements, though not necessarily in the same way or the same order:

a) the presumed calory requirement of an adult male, usually taken as 2550 cals/day

b) an adult equivalence multiplier, based on the age-sex structure of the population, i.e the proportion of the adult male calorie requirement required by the average person. For the Pakistani population this is taken generally as 0.8, regardless of province or rural/urban residence (Ercelawn 1990:13)

c) The cost of meeting this calorie requirement, given existing consumption patterns of the poor

d) An element of non-food expenditure, based on existing ratios of food and non-food expenditure among the poor.

A range of figures based on these elements is as follows:

Monthly per capita Poverty Lines

(Rupees)

Source	1984-5	1990-1
Malik 1988: 'very poor; rural'	159	242
'very poor; urban'	185	281
'poor; rural'	172	261
'poor; urban'	207	315
World Bank 1990[1]	194	295
Ercelawn 1990; Pakistan	152	231
Rural	150	228
Towns	200	304
Cities	290	441
NWFP	145	220
Balochistan	160	243

(1) Based on a paper by Havinga, Haanappel and Louter; re-adjusted to per capita levels

Allowing for the disaggregation by location, there is a broad measure of agreement between these estimates, and with the estimates given above. Ercelawn's estimates are the most systematically worked out, interpolating values of total food and non-food expenditure for households on the threshold of achieving calorie requirements. In a detailed discussion he demonstrates that his estimated province-wise variations are significant for rural areas, but that the national town and city estimates are more robust for urban areas. About 17% of households in Pakistan, 10% of households in NWFP and 30% of households in Balochistan were below the poverty lines he proposes in 1984-85.

Ercelawn then further analyses expenditure for a sub-sample of households who were close to both the calorie and expenditure norms.

Expenditure Components of Poverty Lines

(percentages)

	Rural	Towns	Cities	NWFP	B'stan
Food[1]	58	53	50	60	61
Non-food; of which	42	47	50	40	39
Fuel and lighting	7	6	6	10	9
Clothing and footwear	9	8	7	9	8
Housing	9	14	18	8	7
Health and education	3	4	4	3	2
Other	14	15	15	10	13

(1) includes tobacco

Derived from Ercelawn 1990:25-26

Poverty Lines for Afghan Refugees

Making Pakistani poverty lines relevant to Afghan refugees is problematic, given that poverty lines combine absolute requirements (calories) with culturally determined ones (much non-food expenditure). There is also a danger in combining a succession of estimates, problematic calculations and projections. Nevertheless the above findings can be used (tentatively and as a basis for discussion) to generate what would be poverty lines for refugees in the event of a withdrawal of general rations.

a) Calorie requirements can be deemed to be the same for Pakistanis and Afghans, even if the setting of daily requirements is fraught with difficulty, e.g the question of the sort of work engaged in.

b) Afghans are known to have larger families than Pakistanis, with more small children, thus affecting the adult equivalence multiplier. Calculating this precisely would be difficult, particularly as the best demographic data on Afghans (Scott and Christensen 1988) is compiled in age-groups incompatible with the calorie tables available (Ercelawn 1990:66). Given the uncertainty surrounding the whole exercise, it seems most useful to propose an arbitrary figure of 0.72, or 90% of the Pakistani multiplier.

Distribution of refugees among ethnic groups was also broadly as expected. The higher incidence of Tajiks compared to the UNRISD survey of 1986 was again mainly attributable to Shidi camp.

Ethnic Group	Households	%
Pukhtun	548	78
Tajik	107	15
Nuristani	32	5
Hazara	4	1
Uzbek	2	-
Turkmen	2	-
Baluch	2	-
Pashai	1	-
Arab	1	-
Other/ no response	5	1

In answer to a separate question, 80% identified their language as Pushto and 14% as Dari.

c) It is possible that Afghans have culturally determined consumption patterns leading to a lower cost per calorie than that of Pakistanis (lower consumption of vegetables, meals of bread and tea only). However, greater Afghan meat consumption would work in the opposite direction. It is also arguable whether UNHCR should 'condone' a diet leading to a risk of micro-nutrient deficiency.

d) Non-food expenditure is again culturally determined, but will also be determined by how complete a withdrawal of subsidies from Afghan refugees is envisaged. However, non-food expenditures currently subsidized, health, education, water and even rent, represent a small proportion of the Pakistani poverty lines for rural NWFP and Balochistan. For present purposes, it is proposed to halve the proportions of non-food expenditure in the Pakistani poverty lines, giving multipliers of:

0.77 for towns
0.75 for cities
0.80 for rural NWFP
0.81 for rural Balochistan

These multipliers may well set Afghan poverty lines too low, particularly for scenarios in which rural refugees became liable for house rents at market prices.

Given all the above uncertainties the following poverty lines, in rupees per capita per month for 1990-91, are presented for Afghan refugees not receiving food aid.

Location	Poverty Line
Rural NWFP	158
Rural Balochistan	177
Towns	211
Cities	298

Despite Ercelawn's analysis the figure for cities is probably too skewed by the high cost of living in Karachi to be reliable for Peshawar and Quetta, and the first three figures should be taken as more reliable. It should also be remembered that income/expenditure in kind (for example milk from livestock, home-grown vegetables and fuelwood) should be included in incomes compared to these poverty lines.

ANNEX 4: JIHAD SERVICE

Some comments on jihad sevice are justified, as obligations to go on jihad are often cited as a bar to fuller involvement in the Pakistani economy. It is not known whether Afghans are prone to over-represent or under-represent jihad service in household surveys. There are also great difficulties in comparing figures from different types of surveys, with different sampling methods, done at different times of year. Some figures from after 1986 are included.

Source	Category	Sample	Percentage
SCF 1988	% of women with husband curr-ently on jihad	535 women in 3 RVs in rural NWFP	10
English 1988	% of able-bodied men of household currently on jihad	201 men from 82 project and 20 non-project households	8
HI/UNHCR 1989	% of women with husband curr-ently on jihad	190 women in RVs of Balochistan	18
1991 Household Surveys Phase I	% of adult men with 'mujahidin' given as occupation	704 households in RVs through-out NWFP	0.4
	% of households of which a member had been on jihad in last 15 months		62
Phase II	% of adult men with 'mujahidin' given as employ-ment status	537 households in RVs of Pesh-awar, Kurram and D.I.Khan	4
Songwa 1992	as above	194 households in Kot Chandna camp, Punjab	<1
Taskinuddin 1992	as above	944 households in RVs through-out NWFP	10

As will be seen, one figure from the 1991 household survey stands out far above the others, but this can be explained by the large household size reported in that survey, helping to ensure that someone from a household had been on jihad, and the fact that the information was obtained in response to a question on why people had gone to Afghanistan, and probably included visits for which jihad had only been a secondary reason, if that. The earlier figures are probably a more useful reflection of involvement in jihad, but even then are difficult to contextualize and, as they are, lend little support to a thesis that jihad involvement is inhibiting economic activity.

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ANNEX 5:
METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN INVESTIGATING
THE AFGHAN REFUGEE ECONOMY

Many of the conclusions come to in the main text of this overview, and in other reports prepared on socio-economic aspects of the refugee situation, will appear tentative. It is worth setting out in full the reasons for this, which lie principally in the methodological problems encountered. This may be of value not only for further studies of Afghan refugees, but also of other refugees in similar situations; most specifically long-term refugees who remain <u>partially</u> dependent on assistance.

1. General Problems

1.1 Dependence and Defensiveness

One of the most important problems faced in studying the Afghan economy is that of the reluctance of refugees to disclose their income. This stems primarily from the (accurate) assumption that research into income levels is closely aligned to policy decisions on levels of assistance. Although secretiveness about one's income is a feature of many cultures and social situations, it is exacerbated by the specific circumstances of Afghan refugees and similar populations, that they are dependent <u>both</u> on income from employment and on assistance.

There have been various similar problems. Refugees are reluctant to talk about their repatriation intentions in any but the vaguest terms. Amid rumours that some form of less than voluntary repatriation might be planned, refugees have been reluctant to express their own plans; any show of readiness might, in their view, take the decision out of their hands. Accordingly, in the recent household surveys, only 3% stated that they had plans to encash their passbooks. Conversely, in the Afghan situation where 'local integration' is controversial, refugees who have no intention of repatriating will also be reluctant to say so; or at least we cannot assume that they will all say so. When, as has been the case in Pakistan, refugees are under pressure from their political organizations and each other not to return, the result may be the constant recording of sterotyped answers: 'we will return when there is an Islamic Government in Kabul'.

Solutions to these problems are inevitably partial. In general the various studies carried out in 1991-92 tried to circumvent them through a general-purpose questionnaire, by indirectness, by preferring the specific to the general, and by cross-checking.

The major household surveys carried out used a lengthy questionnaire. This choice was principally determined by the need

for information on a variety of topics, and the lower costs of combining these researches in one exercise. However, we do feel that the length and generality of the questionnaire also served to detract attention from any specific part of it. A questionnire that had focussed only on income, or only on repåtriation, would have received much less response.

Indirectness was used in formulating questions. Often a non-controversial piece of information can be obtained as a proxy for a controversial one. The best example is in the repatriation section of the household survey. The relatively non-controversial questions "has any member of your household visited Afghaistan since Eid-ul-Fitr 1990?" and "does any member of your household plan to visit Afghanistan in the next twelve months?" yielded valuable information on refugees' actual contacts with Afghanistan. Given the emerging consensus that short-term, individual visits are important in gathering information and in preparing materially for eventual whole-family return, such information is far more useful than that on refugees' expressed intentions on repatriating. Other examples could be found in the in-camp monitoring performed by UNHCR's own repatriation monitors.

Preferring the specific to the general is largely another way of putting this. An example would be the use in both the hiring point surveys and the relevant section of the household survey on how many days a casual labourer found work in the last month, rather than a question on his monthly income. In turn, when a question on monthly income was asked, it was asked for each individual rather than for the household. A question on household income that was not preceded by individual questions would have produced meaningless underestimations.

Cross-checking involved the use of different data sources, and different methodologies, to assess the same variable. Thus wage rates and numbers of days worked could be established both from housing point surveys, household surveys and secondary sources. The very existence of large cohorts of low-paid but regular Afghan labourers, such as brick-kiln workers or factory workers, is supporting evidence that actual income from casual work cannot be much higher.

1.2 The Least Investigable Sectors

The principle of cross-checking is made much more difficult in the Afghan case as Afghan refugees are overwhelmingly concentrated in those sectors of the economy which are least tractable to systematic investigation; casual manual labour and the informal bazaar sector. There is virtually no useful official data on these sectors, and costs of primary research would be high, even if a representative sample could be arranged. These problems are returned to in Section 3 below.

The importance of this factor can be seen from a consideration of what research would have been possible if refugees had been concentrated in well-regulated industries with published wage-rates and employment statistics. That they are not is of course a sad and unsurprising fact of most refugee situations. Even a predominantly agricultural refugee population might have been more amenable to economic research, than shifting casual workers or street vendors with their shifting incomes.

Another related problem is a reluctance to admit income from illegal sources; either illegal tout court such as various forms of smuggling, or illegal for refugees, such as owning land. In this case, cross-checking was not possible, but certain assumptions could be made which we feel lessened the importance of such income. Much so-called smuggling is regarded as acceptable by refugees, and no more subject to secrecy than any other income-source. The highly illegal activities, such as drug smuggling, we felt benefitted principally a minority who would anyway be at the top of the income range. Others might benefit indirectly, but only through their ordinary work.

2. Problems with Household Surveys

It became clear that sample surveys of refugee households must form the basis of our research. This led from the above point, that refugees were in economic sectors that were hard to investigate, but more generally from the recognition that only household surveys could show the relation of the different economic sectors to one another in the 'refugee economy'. However, household surveys among Afghan refugees are far from easy. Apart from the very obvious point that household surveys of refugee camps do not cover the non-camp resident population, which among Afghans was significant, there were also a number of general and specific problems associated with household surveys among Afghans.

2.1 Choice of Camps

Although some form of random sampling would theoretically have been preferable for the choice of camps, it was not adopted for a variety of reasons. The survey was originally designed to be small-scale, and purposive sampling based on the Sub-Office's cumulative knowledge of the camps was therefore possible. There was reason to believe that official population figures were highly inaccurate in certain areas, which ruled out certain forms of population-based choice of camps. Some camps were also inaccessible for security reasons, and if chosen would have to have been substituted.

Many of the camps in NWFP are in remote and hard-to-reach areas, and in some areas accomodation for the teams was a problem. Nevertheless, time and resources were made available to meet these difficulties, and a representative number of remote camps were included in the sample.

2.2 Access

A major problem encountered was that of Afghan norms of privacy. Afghans are generally very unwilling to allow strange males into their houses or even their compounds. The implications of this for sampling procedure and household definition are mentioned below, but it also has implications for the quality of data obtained. In the first phase of the male survey, once households had been sampled, interviews were generally carried out in mosques or other public buildings. Respondents were therefore more subject to peer pressure on certain topics, while there was less chance of interviewers independently verifying information, e.g. on assets, livestock and housing. In the second phase, after lengthy negotiations in each camp, interviewers were allowed into compounds and even houses (with women of the households being screened from view). The female survey did not generally face such problems.

2.3 Definition of the Household

The idea of a household survey presupposes a definition of the household, but this definition as it applies to Afghan refugees is far from clear. In some camps, for a start, refugees live in walled compounds, with several families occupying rooms around a central courtyard. Even if such a set-up can be clearly divided into separate 'households' a problem still arises if a sampling method based on counting households is used. To take strictly every *n*th household, would require counting all the households in all the compounds. Even for female teams this would be time-consuming and difficult, for male teams who would not easily be admitted into the compounds at all, virtually impossible.

The definition of household originally adopted broadly corresponded to that of Christensen and Scott (1988:114) "...including all persons who normally have a common kitchen and eat principal meals together; it may include non-family members and temporarily absent members". As Sinclair (1992) has pointed out, this is not unproblematic, given that Afghan men often eat separately from women and children, and that a bread oven may be shared by several 'households' who maintain separate hearths. Furthermore, as male interviewers were not generally allowed inside the households, they were despite the definition and training given to them, forced to accept the implicit definition of household held by their male respondents, which revolved around mutual support and economic

responsibility, and was more likely to include 'temporarily' absent members, if they contributed to the household. The result was that average household sizes reported by men were significantly larger than those reported by women.

2.4 Respondents and Absent Household Members

The large size of Afghan households exacerbates a problem inherent in household surveys, to what extent data should be collected concerning absent household members. The chief argument against such data collection is that it is unreliable; people simply will not know to the required level of accuracy data such as the income level or number of days worked per month of absent household members.

Although this argument is valid, it was outweighed by other considerations. Many Afghan households have more than one earner, so household and per capita income, rather than individual income, become the most important economic indicators, and some attempt has to be made to collect income data on all household members. Even if occupational profiles or employment rates, rather than income data, are required, restricting data collection to people present (or to other pre-defined categories such as household heads, or husbands of female respondents) produces biases and a profile unrepresentative of the refugee population as a whole.

2.5 Income and Expenditure

Income reported in household surveys, especially of refugees, is likely to be underestimated, for reasons that have been made clear **passim**. To a natural tendency to conceal income, especially if it is perceived to affect assistance levels, is added the possibility that some earners may not have been recorded as such. This issue has been discussed at length in the relevant section of the report on the male survey (UNHCR and Morton 1992). Surveys of Afghan women, given the division of labour in the household and the low level of numeracy among women, are unlikely to produce reliable data on income.

Expenditure data was collected in all the surveys, but gave expenditure levels well in excess of admitted income levels. Data was included in the reports, but principally to give an idea of the relative ranking of different sorts of expenditure. Although income levels were underreported, the various cross-checks available suggest that income data was far more reliable in this case than expenditure data.

2.2 Occupation in Afghanistan

As expected, the great majority of respondents had been involved in agricultural or related occupations in Afghanistan.

Occupation	Households	%
Agriculture		
Owner-cultivator[1]	346	49
Tenant	136	19
Livestock owner	73	10
Other[2]	40	6
Total	595	85
Shopkeeping etc.	25	4
Traditional skills[3]	23	3
Teacher	23	3
Transport	14	2
Other non-trad[4]	12	2
Unskilled etc.	12	2

1) May include some non-cultivating landlords 2) Includes 20 farmers wth other jobs and 13 woodcutters 3) Includes traditional services, tailoring and construction skills 4) Includes 7 clerks and 2 mechanics

Given that refugees are legally barred from purchasing land in Pakistan, and for whatever reasons do not seem to gain access to land in other ways, their predominantly agricultural background places them at a severe disadvantage in the Pakistani labour market.

Females of the households were not reported to have engaged in anything but domestic tasks in Afghanistan, with the exception of 5 households where they had worked in embroidery and carpet weaving.

2.3 Arrival in Pakistan

Households had generally left Afghanistan during the early stages of the war (in two cases before the war). The median year of arrival was 1981, and 77% had come to Pakistan in 1983 or earlier. Phase II respondents had generally left even earlier, 70% in 1979-1980.

2.6 Omission of Non-Camp Resident Refugees

That household surveys in camps omit refugees not resident in camps is obvious, but in the Afghan case as in all refugee situations, it brings in quite specific biases. Quite apart from urbanized refugees who form a distinct community (see section 3.6 of the main text) the following categories of Afghan refugee households may have left the camps. Firstly, recent migrants to towns, in cases where the whole family have moved (migration by unaccompanied males should in theory have been caught by our survey, though in practice the data obtained was unreliable). Secondly, some families may have left camps to cultivate land, either that they had illegally purchased, or by sharecropping. It is possible that the extremely low levels of farming reported in the household survey may partly be a result of farming families moving out of camps, or to the very periphery of camps, though there are other reasons why few Afghans have taken up farming. Thirdly, it is likely that a small but significant number of Afghans are now resident in brick-kilns in rural and peri-urban areas of NWFP. While brickmakers are among the lower-paid sections of the refugee workforce, urban migrants and farmers, if they exist in significant numbers, are likely to be among the relatively prosperous.

Household surveys of controlled samples of the non-camp resident would have been very difficult to do in Pakistan. Various forms of informal study of urban refugees and other migrants were undertaken, but it remains hard to identify the processes which relate the camp-population to the non-camp resident.

2.7 Problems in Interviewer Capability

A major problem encountered during the household surveys was that of interviewer capability. This was manifested in two main areas. One was sampling procedure, where a lack of appreciation of the necessity of strict random sampling and the reasons for it may have led to a bias against a) female-headed households, and b) households that were resident in camps other than those in which they are registered. This is explained further in the Appendix to UNHCR and Morton 1992.

The original questionnaire in the male household survey contained branching and conditional sections designed to maximize information on different economic sectors, and on labour migration, while respecting the difficulties of collecting information about absent household members. Dealing with this was the second major area of difficulty for enumerators, who did not consistently use the correct sections for the correct categories of workers. This may have had the very serious effect that some earners were not recorded as such.

These remarks are not made to blame the interviewers for the shortcomings of the survey, but to highlight problems that can occur in surveys. The real purpose of random sampling, exhaustiveness and systematic procedures are often not appreciated by locally-hired interviewers to the extent that survey managers would like to think. In this case, as circumstances dictated the use of interviewers from the refugee community, rather than from the host country, the pool of possible interviewers was smaller, and the possibility of such a problem greater. The problem should be avoided, or at least circumvented, by strict attention to training and pre-testing, and by careful feedback to survey managers of difficulties encountered, which was probably the most important element missing in the male survey. If the available interviewers cannot effectively use a particular questionnaire, at least this fact should be recognized so that the questionnaire can be revised.

3. Problems with Workplace Surveys

The difficulties of investigating the refugee economy through workplaces or hiring places have already been mentioned. Firstly, such studies are unlikely to reveal the relation of economic sectors to one another or to the refugee economy as a whole. Secondly, refugees have been concentrated in sectors of the economy that are least amenable to investigation. Our studies of casual labour (Morton 1992a) are a good example; it was originally thought, at least as a working hypothesis, that surveys at hiring points would be an easy and representative way of studying this sector. It increasingly became apparent that this method was not representative of casual labour; that unknown numbers were reporting to the same sites day after day, or being recruited direct from camps, and that men standing at hiring points tended to represent those without the connections to get more regular work. Figures for average numbers of days worked per month, then, were not representative of the labouring population. However, organizing a survey of workers actually on building sites would have been far more time-consuming, would have presented even greater problems of covering a representative sample, and would have probably produced a bias in the opposite direction, i.e. in favour of more successful workers.

A workplace study that was easy to implement was that of the Jamrud Road Industrial Estate (Morton 1991). The co-operation of the estate manager meant that it was easy, for a very small financial outlay, to estimate numbers of Afghans on the estate, their wages and certain trends in their employment. However, the industrial workers thus located proved to be a tiny fraction, even of refugees from the nearest camps. For sectors that are important, such as that of the 'bazaar', small-scale retail and industry, it is still unclear what we could actually have learnt from surveys, even after considerable outlay. Ashraf's (1988) study of thousands of

shopkeepers and vendors, for example, actually tells us little about the refugee economy, or even about the retail sector in Peshawar. While workplace studies will continue to have their uses, we suggest that household surveys, for all their problems, will remain the most important strategy for researching refugee economies.

Annex 5.8

Year	1973	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Hholds	1	1	21	174	137	73	51	95
Year	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Hholds	59	29	26	6	13	12	2	4

Although one camp, Hawai 8, had deliberately been chosen to represent new arrivals, having been founded to receive refugees from the Jalalabad offensive of 1989, the survey found that only 8 out of 49 respondents there had left Afghanistan in 1989 (10 said they had left in 1988). Overall, as the median number of years respondents had stayed in the camp of current registration was 9, it seemed as if most refugees had made their way fairly quickly to their current camp.

3 Repatriation

542 households, or 77% of the sample, were aware of the encashment scheme for passbooks, but only 20 households, or 3%, had plans to encash. Members of 421 households, or 60% of the sample, had visited their home village in Afghanistan since Eid-ul-Fitr 1990, i.e. in the last 15 months or so, and members of a further 63 households, or 9%, had visited other areas of Afghanistan. It appears as if the majority of those returning, 438 out of 484 households, had gone primarily for jihad, with members of 82 households going for social reasons, and members of only 22 households going for agriculture. Length of stay in Afghanistan (the longest time spent by any household member) had varied from 1 to 15 months, with a median of three months. In 338 households, or 48%, someone intended to visit Afghanistan in the next twelve months, and 672 households, or 95%, expressed an ultimate intention of returning home.

Percentages of households with members who had visited their home village since Eid-ul-Fitr 1990, and members planning to visit Afghanistan in the next twelve months

District/ Agency	PESHAWAR			A'BAD	MARDAN	KOHAT
Camp	Hawai 2	Hawai 8	Michni	Panian	Barakai	Gamkol
Visited village	58	35	81	46	71	61
Plans to visit A.	57	29	70	39	53	45
BANNU	D.I.K.	CHITRAL	BAJAUR	KURRAM		N.WAZ
Bakakhel	Tank	Shidi	Ragha.	Durrani	Asgharo	Tabbi
77	77	61	66	71	89	52
58	76	38	50	66	85	45

The difficulties or problems they expected in their home villages, and en route, (multiple answers were allowed in each case) can be presented as follows:

Difficulty expected in home village	%
Continuation of hostilities	25
Reconstruction of dwelling	96
Restoration of agriculture	85
Lack of health facilities	30
Lack of educational facilities	31
Mines	89
Food shortages	37
High prices	27
Lack of labour opportunities	7
Other	10

Difficulty expected en route	%
Harassment from Pakistanis	4
Harassment from mujahideen	4
Harassment from Kabul regime	66
Continuing hostilities	43
Mines	93
Unavailability/ high cost of transport	96
Other	19

Obviously data on difficulties expected gathered now would be different. It is also uncertain to what extent respondents were listing difficulties they expected when they repatriated, or reasons for not repatriating at that time. In any case, some important conclusions emerge. Transport was thought to be costly or unavailable, and within the villages mines, and the need to restore agricultural production and dwellings, were the most important problems expected. Food shortages and lack of services were also major worries. Even in the event of a cessation of hostilities, it is clear that most refugees would still have credible reservations about returning which would need to be addressed.

4 The Refugee Population

4.1 Demography and Vulnerability

6873 individuals were recorded, giving an average household size of 9.8. The distribution of household size is shown below.

No. of members	Households	%age of households	No. of members	Households	%age of households
2	4	1	11	54	8
3	11	2	12	40	6
4	9	1	13	28	4
5	24	3	14	18	3
6	49	7	15	16	2
7	87	12	16-20	44	6
8	113	16	21-25	7	1
9	102	14	26-30	4	1
10	90	13	>30	2	-

Family heads, their wives and children accounted for 4889 individuals, or 71% of the sample. In other words, substantial numbers of households were augmented by other categories of kin; parents, grandchildren, siblings of the head of household and others. One conclusion to be drawn from this, and the mean and distribution of household size, is that a survey using only male interviewers to talk to male respondents tends to produce a broad and inclusive definition of household, even when interviewers have been trained to use a more restrictive definition (in this case 'those normally eating from a common pot').

SOCIO-ECONOMIC SURVEYS OF MALE AFGHAN REFUGEES IN THE REFUGEE VILLAGES OF NWFP

Final Report

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May 1992

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

During the second half of 1991, a team of male Afghan interviewers conducted a household survey of 1241 households in refugee camps throughout North West Frontier Province. This survey constitutes the single most important source of information on refugees in NWFP since the UNRISD survey of 1986[1].

The survey confirmed known facts about the origins of the refugee population; that it overwhelmingly came from the border provinces, particularly Paktia and Nangarhar, and is almost entirely Pushtun by ethnicity and language; that the great bulk of refugees arrived in the early stages of the Afghan conflict; and that it was almost entirely a population of farmers. This last is of crucial importance to Afghan survival strategies in a situation where the purchase of land is almost the only legal restriction placed on refugees, and is one reason for Afghans' concentration in casual unskilled labour and other parts of the informal sector.

Most refugees were aware of the encashment scheme for repatriation, but admitted, at that time, to no plans to encash. There were high, and in some camps very high, proportions of households who kept in touch with their home villages through the visits of family members to Afghanistan. Nearly all households expressed an intention of returning to Afghanistan eventually.

The refugee economy has to be understood with reference to the demography of the refugee population. Male repondents tended to adopt a broad definition of household, and the mean household size was 9.8, with some variation between camps. The male understanding of household probably meant that female-headed households were subsumed in larger units and not reported in any significant numbers at all; 16% of households are without an able-bodied male of normal working age. Disability was not reported particularly frequently. The adult population, especially the women, were mainly illiterate. School attendance among boys was moderate, that among girls very low indeed.

Though there is likely to have been some dissembling of registration status, the survey confirms that there is a substantial proportion of unregistered households, though this varies considerably between camps. Admitted multiple holding of passbooks was very rare. It is also important to note that the registered households contain on average 9.9 members, while being entitled through their passbooks to rations for an average of 7.0 people.

While the amount of food assistance actually received per registered individual is roughly correct, as far as our methods could show, refugees themselves are aware of deductions by maliks, millers and transporters equivalent to 21% of the wheat ration. The combined effect of the presence of unregistered individuals in registered households, these deductions, and the likely actual delivery in 1991 of only 8 of the 12 monthly ration installments,

amounts to the average refugee in a registered household receiving 5 kg of wheat or less per month.

Such a level of food assistance inevitably entails refugees spending cash on food. Although expenditure data is very problematic in such circumstances, it does enable us to see that there is significant expenditure on wheat and other food items. There is also significant non-food expenditure, especially on fuel, clothing, medicine and transport. Few households possess either luxury material possessions, economically productive assets such as looms or vehicles, or livestock.

The majority of adult male refugees are employed as unskilled casual labourers, and as such are underemployed, averaging only 15 days work per month. Casual labourers and the regularly employed alike report low monthly incomes. Although there is frequently more than one earner per household, the number of dependents makes per capita income very low, with a mean of Rs 120-130 per month. While this is a substantial improvement on 1986 figures, even allowing for inflation, it still places around 70% of households below what could be considered a poverty line for refugees, and nearly all households below the poverty line for local people.

1) H.Christensen and W.Scott, Survey of the Social and Economic Conditions of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, UNRISD, Geneva, 1988